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This paper considers Damasio’s concept of the somatic marker from two new perspectives. The first of these
considers them from the point of view of Dawkins’s concept of the extended phenotype. This is used to
develop the idea of the extended somatic marker, viz. a marker which uses some non-somatic feature of the
external world in a similar fashion to the somatic marker. Secondly an analogy is developed with the concept
of hardware interlocks in safety-critical systems. This is used to suggest why it is important that somatic
markers are bodily states and not just mental markers.
1 Somatic Markers
Damasio Damasio (1994) has introduced the notion of
the somatic marker—a bodily state which plays a role in
cognition, in particular the direction of attention. More
specifically, a somatic marker is some bodily state which
is generated as the consequence of some mental process.
This state is then reperceived by the mind, and as a con-
sequence the mental state changed. An example of such a
marker is the rapid onset of nausea upon witnessing an act
of violence. This bodily state does not have any immedi-
ate relevance to the mental state which has generated it, in
contrast, say, to a feeling of nausea generated by viewing
a plate of rotting food. Some such states might be ex-
plained away as side-effects. For example a rapid change
of hormone levels upon witnessing violence in prepara-
tion for running from the danger might also trigger nau-
sea.
However the somatic marker hypothesis suggests that
such reactions are not mere side-effects. Instead they are
a way of generating a rapid shift of attention, using the
body state in an arbitrary fashion to draw mental atten-
tion to the current situation. The presence of the marker
in the body draws the mind’s attention towards it, and as
a consequence the mind if focused on the meaning of that
marker. It is plausible that such phenomena are exapta-
tions Gould and Lewontin (1979) from unwanted physical
reactions to change in body state as discussed above.
This can be seen as an aspect of mind which is realised
away from the usual mental substrate. The somatic re-
sponse is being used as a way of carrying out a process
(bringing the attention of many mental processes together
to focus on a single danger point) which cannot be carried
out within the computational model implemented on the
substrate.
The aim of this paper is to consider why the markers
in question need to be somatic as such. Two aspects of
this question are considered. Firstly, would it be possible
for markers to extend beyond the body? This is explored
with reference to Dawkins’s concept of the extended phe-
notype. Secondly, why is it important that such markers
be in the body, instead of being more simply realised by
mental markers? This is explored with regard to the idea
of hardware interlocks in engineering design.
2 Could “somatic” markers extend
beyond the body?
Why do markers need to be internal body states. Is there
anything which is special to the body which means that
the markers could not instead be realised elsewhere in the
world, external to the body? Might some of our actions
in the world act as triggers to affect, perceived directly
through the usual perceptive system rather than by bodily
self-awareness?
One approach to this draws on ideas from Dawkins’s
book The Extended Phenotype Dawkins (1982). In biol-
ogy, the phenotype is the expression of a gene or set of
genes in the world. This encompasses both the aspects
concerned with the physical structure of the creature and
through the ways in which genes have influences on be-
haviour. For example we can talk about the “blue-eyed”
phenotype versus the “brown-eyed phenotype” of some
animal. This is distinguished from the “genotype”, i.e.
the set of genes of interest. Sometimes more than one
genotype can give rise to the same phenotype (e.g. where
there are regressive traits).
The difficulty starts when we want to say where the
boundary of the phenotype lies. Clearly certain things are
in the phenotype for certain. A clear example of this is
the sequence of proteins associated with a particular ex-
pression of a particular gene. A standard definition would
extend this to the whole body; genes influence the growth,
development, and activity of the body (alongside other in-
fluences).
Dawkins’s argument is that it is naive to simply say
that everything inside the body should be considered to
be phenotype, whereas everything outside should not. For
example consider an imaginary species of bird in which
the male has a gene which predisposes itself to mate with
females which have blue feathers. It could be argued that
this gene is also a gene for blue feathers in the female, as
as a result of the presence of the gene blue feathers will
spread through the female population. To abstract this, the
genotype in the male bird is having a phenotypic effect in
the female bird. Why should we regard the gene’s effect
on the feathers of the female bird in any different way to
another gene which causes the male bird to have red eyes?
A similar kind of argument can be made about the so-
matic marker hypothesis. Damasio argues for a body-
minded brain in which we create emotions via “somatic
markers”. These work by parts of the brain recognizing an
emotionally charged stimulus, and then rather than creat-
ing a direct link to an action on that stimulus, the “marker”
consisting of a bodily reaction is created. This is then re-
perceived by the brain as is the basis for action or for rapid
alteration of emotional state.
Why do these markers have to be physically internal to
the body? It would seem that the same reasoning could
be applied to markers which I leave in the external world
when I have an emotion. For example if I am anxious then
I might scribble on the pad of paper in front of me, with-
out attending to this scribbling. This could then become
a marker, in this case perceived via the eyes rather than
through internal perception of bodily state. Why should it
matter whether I use a bodily state or an external state as
the substrate for the marker?
It may be that there are reasons why somatic markers
need be somatic. One could be that the speed of reac-
tion required is just too quick to be capable of being car-
ried out by the external perceptive system. Another more
convincing explanation is that the reason we use somatic
markers is to communicate with multiple brain regions in
a simultaneous and co-ordinated way, and therefore we
need something which can be perceived in a direct way
by different parts of the brain.
This might be a continuum effect. An example of a
thing which might be seen as either an external or so-
matic marker is biting nails when anxious. This is in
many ways an external physical process, nonetheless we
can perceive the nail state internally via soreness of fin-
gers. There must be other similar examples. Perhaps
nail-chewing is “causing” the anxiety (in the sense of be-
ing part of the causal chain between subconscious per-
ception of an anxiety-producing stimulus and the affec-
tive response) rather than being an epiphenomenon of the
emotional state.
3 Why do markers need to be con-
fined to the body?
So far we have considered why it is that the somatic
marker need be constrained to the body, and is it impor-
tant to make a body/non-body distinction. Now we ad-
dress the opposite question: why is it not sufficient for
the marker to be a mental marker? Why not just make
a “mental note”? Whilst there are circumstances where
a truly somatic marker can get transformed into a men-
tal process in the limbic system Damasio (1994), this is
not always the case; markers are not always transferred
in this fashion. It is interesting to consider whether there
might be reasons why the evolution of the mind might
have led to the markers being body-centred rather than
mind-centered.
One reason may be for safety. In the design of com-
plex systems involving computer-controlled mechanical
and electrical devices it is common for there to be con-
servative safety devices included in the system known as
hardware interlocks Leveson and Turner (1993); Leve-
son (1995). A hardware interlock is a device which is
independent of the main control system, and which is de-
signed to monitor just on small aspect of the system, typi-
cally by using its own sensor system. So for example in a
radiotherapy device, an interlock might exist which mon-
itors the output of radiation, and if more than a certain
amount is let out in one minute, the interlock shuts down
the device completely.
Hardware interlocks are designed to be parts of the
overall system which do not depend on the abstraction of-
fered by the overall control system. For example they do
not take information from the main system sensors, nor do
they use the main control system e.g. for timing, and they
do not sit upon the operating system abstraction used by
the controlling structure. To do this would compromise
their role as a safety-critical component; they provide a
reassurance of safety because they are separate, they are
independent from the main abstraction. If the main sen-
sors go wrong, or the builder of the controller has misun-
derstood the relationship between the abstraction offered
by the operating system and the real hardware and soft-
ware, it does not matter.
One important role in the body-mind system is to re-
act quickly and reliably to dangerous phenomena. There
would seem to be a prima facie case for thinking that if
engineers consider the use of such hardware interlocks as
an important way of responding to danger in computer-
controlled systems, evolution may have created such in-
terlock systems for dangers to animals.
It may be that our body-grounded response to danger
is a response of this kind. Instead of making a mind-
centered judgement about the danger of a situation, we
instead make a rapid decision based on a few simple
cues. One characteristic of hardware interlocks is that
they typically work on a small number of basic sensors
which facilitate a conservative approximation to safety.
The same may be true of interlocks in the mind-body sys-
tem: our sensory system perceives a small number of sim-
ple “danger signals” (such as a rapid movement) and trig-
gers an action within the body immediately. This “mas-
sive synchronization” acts as a counterpart to the more
commonly-discussed “massive parallelism” of the neural-
network-based mind.
Typically the fact that the brain is a unified system with
all aspects connected and mutually-accessible is seen to
be to its advantage. Similarly the unity found in a com-
plex software system is often seen as being to its advan-
tage; instead of having to connect individual components
together as needed (as might be the case in an electronic
system) all information is passed to a central repository
and accessed as needed. However in some situations it
is necessary both with computers and with minds for the
complete attention of the system to be directed towards
one thing. Hardware interlocks provide a way for such
responses to “leap out” of the complexity of the con-
trol software for certain emergency situations. This non-
decomposability, and the consequent need for a power-
ful way of leaping out of the complex interactions, would
seem to be particularly strong for neural-network-based
systems where the system is highly non-decomposable.
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